UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/25959
16 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The latest information coming in from Gorazde, a town designated as a "safe area" by Security Council resolution 836 (1993), reports that the horrendous humanitarian situation has not changed. The town remains under constant heavy artillery attacks from all directions by the Serbian aggressor forces. The United Nations observers dispatched from Sarajevo, in order to investigate the present inhuman circumstances, have not yet been allowed by Serbian forces to reach Gorazde. Instead, from the direction of Ustipraca, Serbian forces have dispatched a column of tanks headed for Gorazde. Tanks and other armoured vehicles are tightening their stranglehold around the city with the calculated intention of wiping it out, together with its 70,000 inhabitants.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
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Security Council

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S/25960
16 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council a report submitted by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

Annex

Report by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission

Introduction

1. In response to a wish expressed by members of the Security Council, the Special Commission herewith presents an account of the Government of Iraq's attitude on certain aspects of implementation of its obligations under section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent relevant resolutions and agreements.

Recent developments

(a) Installation of monitoring cameras

2. On 6 June 1993, the Special Commission informed Iraq of its intention to install remote control cameras to monitor rocket test stands at two sites, Yawm al Azim and Al Rafah. On 7 June 1993, a senior Iraqi representative informed the chief of the UNSCOM expert team dispatched to Iraq for the installation of the cameras that Iraq would not accept any monitoring activities and would insist that the Special Commission limit itself to inspection activities under resolution 687.

3. This position was confirmed in a letter of 8 June 1993 from Mr. Riyadh al-Qaysi, Iraqi Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Deputy Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, which stated that the installation of the cameras did not fall under the purview of resolution 687 (1991) "but rather comes within the framework of matters and questions that are still the subject of dialogue between the Iraqi authorities on the one hand and the Special Commission on the other".

4. In a letter of 9 June 1993 to the Deputy Foreign Minister, the Executive Chairman stated that the installation of cameras was "done in implementation of the mandate entrusted to the Commission by the Council in resolution 687 (1991) and the subsequent resolutions of the Council which are required by the terms of or elaborate upon the provisions of section C of resolution 687 (1991), all of which were adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter". The Chairman continued in his letter:

> "I am thus reporting to the President of the Council that Iraq has refused to permit the inspection team to install essential equipment which would allow the Commission to determine on a continuing basis whether, at the sites in question, Iraq is meeting its unconditional undertaking not to use, develop, construct or acquire missiles prohibited in terms of paragraph 8 of the same resolution. This breach of resolution 687 (1991), and other Council decisions, is compounded by a breach of the status arrangements of May 1991 between the United Nations and Iraq, pursuant to which the Commission has the 'right to install equipment or construct facilities for observation, inspection, testing or monitoring activity ...'."

5. The Deputy Foreign Minister responded in a letter of 11 June 1993 to the Executive Chairman, inter alia, the following:

> "With regard to the question of setting up cameras at Yawm Al-A'zam and Al-Rafah sites, I should like, first of all, to remind you that what we requested in our letter dated 8 June 1993 was 'postponement of the decision' on the subject until the convening of the meeting that we had proposed in the letter dated 30 May 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Thus, what really gives rise to surprise is that you should infer from this legitimate and permissible request that the Iraqi authorities had refused permission for the inspection team to perform its assigned task, particularly after the reasons and motives for our position had been explained in detail at two extensive meetings to Mr. Nikita Smidovich on 7 and 8 June, and most particularly after my telling him that we were not opposed to the principle of the use of cameras in the Special Commission's work. Indeed, the main thing is a discussion of this question and the other questions that are regarded as outstanding in the dialogue for which we called. With the exception of this question, the inspection team has carried out and is carrying out all the tasks for which it came, with facility and with the full cooperation of the competent Iraqi authorities ...".

6. At a meeting the same day with the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations, the Executive Chairman repeated the position of the Commission as outlined in the letter of 9 June.

7. Resolution 687 calls on Iraq not to reacquire banned weapons and items and on the Commission to verify Iraq's compliance with all its obligations. Based on resolution 687, Iraq and the United Nations exchanged letters in May and June 1991 which form the status agreement for UNSCOM and IAEA operations in Iraq. This specifically allows UNSCOM to "install equipment or construct facilities for observation, inspection, testing or monitoring activity". The Iraqi position ignores the fact that resolution 687 (1991) called for the Secretary-General to draw up a plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's obligations not to reacquire banned items or capabilities. This plan was duly approved under resolution 715 (1991), adopted unanimously by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. Thus the issue is not even up for discussion, let alone "still the subject of dialogue" - the plan is mandatory and enforceable. Indeed, the Council has repeatedly rejected Iraq's earlier calls for dialogue on the terms of implementation of the Council's resolutions and has demanded Iraq's full compliance with all relevant resolutions, including resolution 715 and the plans approved thereunder (S/23517, S/23609, S/23663, S/23699, S/23709, S/24836, S/24839).

8. On 14 June 1993, in separate conversations between officials from the Special Commission on the one hand and, on the other, with the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations in New York and with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Iraq in Vienna, the Commission again informed Iraq of the seriousness of the situation and of the urgency of resolving the issue of installation of the cameras.

9. Iraq's obstruction in this instance is a further failure by Iraq to fulfil its obligations under relevant resolutions of the Security Council and

agreements with the Special Commission. Its insistence that UNSCOM limit itself to activities under resolution 687 is a direct challenge to the authority of the Security Council and the force of its resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter.

(b) Destruction of chemical production equipment

10. On 15 April 1993, during inspection UNSCOM55, the Chief Inspector handed over to the Iraqi side a letter requiring the removal by 31 May 1993 of chemical weapons precursor chemicals and certain items of equipment used in the $PCl_3/POCl_3$ production plant at Fallujah to Muthanna for destruction there under UNSCOM supervision. These items had been acquired by Iraq specifically for the production of these chemical weapons precursors and as part of Iraq's CW programme. Consequently, the Commission decided that they needed to be destroyed. Irreversible conversion was not possible and, in any case, Iraq continues not to accept monitoring of dual-purpose equipment under the terms of the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification approved by the Council in its resolution 715 (1991) adopted unanimously under Chapter VII of the Charter. In such conditions, the Commission cannot guarantee the non-prohibited use of any equipment redeployed by Iraq.

11. Iraq replied to this demand on 29 April 1993 saying that it wished to redeploy this equipment for use in insecticide production. On 14 May 1993, the Commission responded that it had taken into account Iraq's request for reuse of the equipment but that it stood by the earlier decision that, because the items were specifically acquired for the purpose of chemical weapons production, the equipment be removed and destroyed. Iraq responded to this letter on 27 May 1993, saying that the Commission had gone to extremes, adverse to Iraq, in interpreting its mandate, criticizing it, the Sanctions Committee and the Security Council respectively for their decisions relating to the destruction of equipment associated with weapons programmes, to Iraq's requests for imports, and to the decisions to maintain sanctions. It accused the Commission and the Committee of following a policy of revenge against the Iraqi people and requested that the Commission change its decision. The Commission again responded on 4 June 1993, reminding Iraq of its obligations under the relevant resolutions and the Commission's rights and duties. It explained that the equipment in question could not be rendered harmless as it was intrinsically capable of being used for prohibited purposes and could quickly be reconverted for such. It gave Iraq until 10 June 1993 to complete the removal of the equipment and warned Iraq that failure to do so would result in the Commission reporting the matter to the Council.

12. In a letter of 11 June 1993 to the Executive Chairman, the Deputy Foreign Minister stated, inter alia:

> "Iraq ... remains prepared to give the Special Commission, through bilateral technical consultations, practical guarantees to ensure the peaceful use of this equipment in the long term. Furthermore, we see no practical or technical justification for linking the subject of guarantees which Iraq has proposed to provide of the peaceful use of this equipment to the attitude to resolution 715 (1991), in particular after our assurances that we are prepared to give the Special Commission practical guarantees to ensure non-prohibited use" and "we repeat our proposal for a detailed

technical discussion between the experts of both sides in order to arrive at a joint formula which would give the Special Commission assurances and guarantees concerning the peaceful uses of this equipment in the long term".

13. At the above-mentioned meeting of 11 June, the Executive Chairman reiterated that the Commission had to insist on the destruction of chemical weapons production equipment, as this equipment was acquired exclusively for weapons purposes, and if converted for non-military use, could readily be reconverted for proscribed use.

14. On 12 June an inspection team of the Commission reported from an inspection at the Fallujah production plant that the equipment to be destroyed (with the exception of one reactor vessel which had been moved to Muthanna) was still kept at Fallujah. Commission personnel continue to monitor the situation. As of 15 June, only 5 of the 11 pieces of equipment had been moved from Fallujah to Muthanna. A quantity of the precursor chemicals also had not been moved. The Commission has, so far, no undertaking by Iraq to move all the items, as instructed.

15. Iraq's continuing and insistent refusal to move the chemical weapons production equipment at Fallujah to Muthanna for immediate destruction is an outright violation of its obligations under resolution 687 (1991), which puts into question Iraq's overall readiness to implement the relevant resolutions.

General context

16. These events in Iraq during the last week have confirmed assessments made in recent reports of the Special Commission to the Security Council. The report of 19 April 1993 (S/25620) noted, inter alia, that:

- "there has been no movement in Iraq's underlying negative position on the plan and resolution 715 (1991)";

- "the Commission understood [Iraq's insistence that interim monitoring be conducted under resolution 687] to mean that Iraq would prevent this team, or any other, from operating under the terms of the plan approved under resolution 715 (1991)"; and

- "Iraq has, through its conduct over recent months, consistently demonstrated its desire to limit the Commission's inspection rights and operational capabilities through seeking to place restrictions on the inspectors in the course of their work".

17. The report of 17 December 1992 as S/24984 noted that:

"it is difficult not to believe that the decrease in security is the result of a centrally coordinated government campaign to intimidate and humiliate UNSCOM staff. While some incidents may be spontaneous, the atmosphere in which such acts might be considered by Iraqi citizens has been fostered by Iraqi officials, presumably with the backing of the Government, and those officials have done little to rectify the situation."

18. All the above has to be seen in the context of repeated incidents of harassment of UNSCOM and other United Nations personnel in Iraq, most recently seen in the attack on UNSCOM vehicles reported to the Council on 8 June 1993, and against the background of Iraq's conduct over recent months, consistently demonstrating its effort to limit the Commission's inspection rights and operational capabilities (see the annex to report S/25620 of 19 April 1993).

19. Amongst the most serious of these impediments to the Commission's task has been Iraq's attitude towards the use of helicopters for the purpose of surveillance and operational support. Iraq's blocking of an helicopter aerial surveillance flight was reported to the Council in paragraph 11 (f) of report S/24984. Iraq refused that flight on the grounds that it would overfly Baghdad. Since then, and on a continuing basis, Iraq has hindered the work of the Commission by automatically objecting to any proposed helicopter flight which entails a "box" in the vicinity of Baghdad. (Such "boxes" tend to be in the order of 40 km^2. They are given to the Iraqi authorities the night before a flight to enable them to ensure that Iraqi air defences are aware of the UNSCOM flight and hence do not treat it as a hostile intruder while at the same time not revealing the precise site to be surveyed.)

20. The resolutions provide the Commission with the absolute right to fly aerial surveillance over Iraq without exception. While the Commission seeks to take into account Iraq's legitimate concerns, security or otherwise, it has informed Iraq that it must and will assert its right to overfly Baghdad as and when there is an operational need to do so. Such an operational need may arise at any time, depending on the information and equipment available to the Commission.

Conclusions

21. Iraq has sought to make an issue of principle out of the installation of the monitoring cameras. This fits in with a general pattern of statements and behaviour on the part of Iraq concerning those aspects of resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions which deal with the long-term monitoring of Iraq's obligations not to reacquire the weapons capabilities banned to it under the terms of the cease-fire resolution. Essentially, while not explicitly rejecting the monitoring provisions but rather expressing a willingness to renegotiate their terms, Iraq's actions have, in effect, prevented the initiation of implementation of the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification adopted under resolution 715 (1991) and amount to a de facto rejection of the Council's resolutions and decisions in this regard.

22. The Commission insists on the destruction of the chemical production equipment and the precursor chemicals because both were specifically acquired for Iraq's chemical weapons programme. The equipment is inherently such that it could easily and rapidly be reconverted from permitted to prohibited purposes.

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Security Council

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S/25961
17 June 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 15 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 8 June 1993 from Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning decisions adopted by the Sanctions Committee at its 93rd meeting.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and the annexed letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 8 June 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to our letter dated 21 May 1993, in which I explained certain practices and decisions adopted in the name of the Committee established by Security Council resolution 661 (1990), known as the Sanctions Committee, and the unjust and unjustifiable positions imposed on the Committee by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Japan, reflecting continual hostile and scheming intentions vis-à-vis the people of Iraq, aimed at depriving it of its essential humanitarian needs in the name of international legitimacy.

The decisions of the Sanctions Committee at its 93rd meeting, held on 5 May 1993, clearly show the injustice and wrong being done to the Iraqi people in the service of inimical political aims that govern the conduct of the representatives of the said countries within the Committee. It has been confirmed, moreover, that the political motives and scheming intentions of those countries constitute their sole objective, with no regard whatsoever for the needs and suffering of the Iraqi people despite Iraq's performance of its obligations under the Security Council resolutions.

In a rapid review of the requests rejected by the Committee at that meeting, we note the following:

1. Objection by the United States to 7 requests;

2. Objection by the United Kingdom to 7 requests;

3. Objection by France to 6 requests;

4. Objection by Japan to 3 requests.

In addition, numerous other requests have been kept in abeyance or deferred on a variety of pretexts, to the surprise and vexation to many other members of the Committee.

The best example of what we are saying is provided by the decisions adopted by the Committee at its most recent meeting, of which we shall cite a number:

1. Rejection of a request to supply Iraqi merchants with quantities of glue, due to objections on the part of the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom on the grounds that they constituted an input to Iraqi industry.

2. Rejection of a request to supply the State Enterprise for Tobacco and Cigarettes with quantities of Virginia tobacco, due to an objection on the part of the representative of the United States on the grounds that they constituted an input to Iraqi industry.

3. Rejection of a request to supply the Government fertilizer company with quantities of caustic soda and sodium phosphate for water-treatment purposes, due to an objection on the part of the representative of the United States, seconded by the representative of the United Kingdom, on the grounds that the end user was unknown.

4. Rejection of a request to supply water desalination equipment to the South Refinery in Basra, due to an objection by the representative of the United States on the grounds that such equipment could be used for other purposes. Here the Sanctions Committee was ignoring the reports of the humanitarian missions and international organizations that had visited the area and stressed in their reports Iraq's need for such equipment.

5. Rejection of a request to supply Iraqi merchants with construction cement additives due to an objection by the representative of the United Kingdom, on the grounds that such materials would enhance Iraq's industrial infrastructure, as though the Security Council resolutions contained anything to the effect that Iraqi citizens had no right to build dwellings, which is the first of all human rights.

6. Rejection of a request to supply Iraqi merchants with tyres and oil filters for vehicles due to an objection on the part of the representative of France on the grounds that they would be used for private vehicles. Here we ask ourselves what is wrong with an Iraqi national using his private car like any individual belonging to any other people in the world.

Some members of the Committee, in their political motives and scheming intentions hostile to the Iraqi people, fail to take into consideration the reports of the humanitarian missions which have visited the area and clearly reported the scope of the severe shortages affecting the basic civilian and humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, especially in the areas of food and health, and their impact on children, the elderly, women and pregnant mothers, in particular. Moreover, the continuation of this situation has resulted in an elevation of mortality rates among children, the elderly and the sick.

We adjure you once again, even more strongly than before, to exercise your good offices and intervene in earnest to call a halt to these practices of the Sanctions Committee, which run counter to all humanitarian values and considerations, so as not to impair the credibility of the international Organization, whose reputation is sullied by such practices. I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

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General Assembly
Security Council

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A/48/213
S/25962
17 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Item 79 of the preliminary list*
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 16 June 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Moldova to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the Declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova dated 16 June 1993, on the statement of the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Boris Yeltsin, regarding the possibility of the creation of Russian military bases on the territory of some of the former Soviet republics (see annex).

I would appreciate it if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 79 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Tudor PANTIRU
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Moldova to the United Nations

* A/48/50.

ANNEX

Declaration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova

(Chisinau, 16 June 1993)

Taking note of the statement of the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Boris Yeltsin, at the recent meeting with the senior officials of the Russian Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova feels compelled to reiterate its fundamental position, stated on numerous occasions, regarding the complete, unconditional and immediate withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Moldovan territory, which is in accordance with the documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and other international organizations.

In this context, Mr. Yeltsin's proposal, presented at that meeting, regarding the possible creation of military bases on the territories of some former Soviet republics is unacceptable to the Republic of Moldova, under any circumstances.

However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova does welcome President Yeltsin's second proposal, that of "withdrawal of the Russian military forces from all former Soviet republics" and considers it to be the only realistic and just solution that could accommodate the interests of both the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation. In this respect, the signing, in the near future, of an agreement between the two nations regarding the immediate and unconditionaL withdrawal of the Russian military forces from the territory of the Republic of Moldova will not only greatly increase the chances of a political resolution of the conflict in the Eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova but will also contribute to further development of the relations between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation, as well as the strengthening of Russia's credibility and prestige in the world.

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S/25963
17 June 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 16 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF KUWAIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I am transmitting to you hereunder the text of the statement issued by the Kuwaiti Council of Ministers following the adoption by the Security Council of its resolution 833 (1993) concerning the completion by the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission of its work.

"Kuwait affirms that it will honour and be bound by Security Council resolution 833 (1993) and all the relevant Security Council resolutions. The Council has welcomed the final report of the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission entrusted with the implementation of paragraph 3 of its resolution 687 (1991). It has reaffirmed that the Commission's decisions are final. It has underlined and reaffirmed its decision to guarantee the inviolability of the international boundary between Kuwait and Iraq and to take as appropriate all necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter. It has recalled that, through the demarcation process, the Commission entrusted with the task of demarcating the boundary between Kuwait and Iraq by its resolutions 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 and 689 (1991) of 9 April 1991 was not reallocating territory between Kuwait and Iraq but was simply carrying out the technical task necessary to demarcate the precise coordinates of the boundary on the basis of the existing agreements and the supporting documentation and evidence provided by the two parties to the Commission, whose decisions are to be considered final as of their adoption. It has demanded that Iraq and Kuwait, in accordance with international law and relevant Security Council resolutions, respect the inviolability of the international boundary, as demarcated by the Commission, and the right to navigational access.

"Kuwait regards the Security Council resolution as an enlightened achievement for the Organization and for international legitimacy and one to be added to its series of achievements contributing to the promotion of international peace and justice. Kuwait takes this opportunity to alert all the countries of the world to the need to maintain pressure on the Iraqi regime to implement all of the relevant Security Council resolutions and particularly those relating to the speedy release of the Kuwaiti prisoners and hostages and third-country nationals that the Iraqi regime is still holding in its prisons and detention camps."

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad A. ABULHASAN
Permanent Representative

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GENERAL

S/25964
17 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 JUNE 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 797 (1992) of 16 December 1992, by which the Council decided to establish a United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), and to my previous letters concerning the composition of the military component of ONUMOZ.

Having completed additional consultations, I propose that the military elements of ONUMOZ be also composed of contingents from the following States, both of which have expressed their readiness in principle to make the necessary personnel available: the Republic of Congo and the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

I am continuing to consult certain other States and will revert to the Security Council when I have an indication of whether they are also ready in principle to contribute military personnel to this mission.

I should be grateful if you would bring these matters to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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GENERAL

S/25965
17 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 11 June 1993 (S/25964) concerning the composition of the military component of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They agree with the proposal contained in your letter.

(Signed) Juan Antonio YAÑEZ-BARNUEVO
President of the Security Council

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Security Council

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S/25966
17 June 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND FRENCH

France, Russian Federation, Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General (S/25939 and Corr.1 and Add.1) pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 836 (1993) concerning the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Reiterating once again its alarm at the grave and intolerable situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina arising from serious violations of international humanitarian law,

Recalling the overwhelming importance of seeking a comprehensive political solution to the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Determined to implement fully the provisions of resolution 836 (1993),

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General;

2. Decides to authorize the reinforcement of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to meet the additional force requirements mentioned in paragraph 6 of the report of the Secretary-General as an initial approach;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the consultations, inter alia, with the Governments of the Member States contributing forces to UNPROFOR, called for in resolution 836 (1993);

4. Reaffirms its decision in paragraph 10 of resolution 836 (1993) on the use of air power, in and around the safe areas, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate, and encourages Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to coordinate closely with the Secretary-General in this regard;

5. Calls upon Member States to contribute forces, including logistic support and equipment to facilitate the implementation of the provisions regarding the safe areas;

6. Invites the Secretary-General to report to the Council on a regular basis on the implementation of resolution 836 (1993) and this resolution;

7. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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S/25967
17 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 JUNE 1993 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF PORTUGAL, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from our Governments, we have the honour to send to you the English and Portuguese texts of the statement made by the Heads of the delegations of Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America in Washington D.C., on 8 June 1993, concerning the situation in Angola, and to request that this be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) José Caetano da COSTA PEREIRA
Minister Plenipotentiary
Chargé d'affaires of Portugal to the
United Nations

(Signed) Yuliy M. VORONTSOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the
Russian Federation to the
United Nations

(Signed) Madeleine Korbel ALBRIGHT
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the
United States of America to the
United Nations

Annex

The delegations of Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, led respectively by the Secretary of State for Cooperation, José Manuel Briosa e Gala, Director of the African Department, Grigory B. Karassine, and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, George E. Moose, met in Washington, D.C. the eighth of June 1993 in order to review the latest developments in Angola and to consider ways to re-establish peace.

The delegations reaffirmed that a political solution offers the only prospect for ending the post-electoral crisis in Angola. In this regard, deep disappointment was expressed regarding UNITA's refusal to initial the set of principles in the Abidjan Protocol, which could have led to an immediate cease-fire in place, a phased withdrawal of UNITA forces and the simultaneous and gradual insertion of United Nations personnel to monitor the cease-fire. The delegations reiterated their support for United Nations Security Council resolution 834 of 1 June 1993 which unanimously condemned UNITA's actions and urged all States to refrain from providing any form of direct or indirect military assistance or other support to UNITA inconsistent with the peace process. It was also agreed that the United Nations continues to have an essential role in the search for a lasting solution to the present crisis.

The delegations observed that the intensification of hostilities by UNITA since the 21 May suspension of the peace talks, its continuing efforts to seize additional territory and its destruction of economic assets and infrastructure critical to the welfare of the people of Angola, strongly contradict UNITA's declarations that it is seeking a peaceful solution. These actions call into serious question UNITA's intention to reach a negotiated settlement. The delegations stressed that UNITA's continuing threats against nationals and property of their respective countries are seriously undermining the efforts of the observer to facilitate future negotiations that could lead to peace. Within this context, the observers reiterate their strong support for United Nations Security Council resolution 804 of 29 January, particularly paragraph 11 which demands that UNITA immediately release foreign nationals taken hostage.

The 3 June donor's conference in Geneva welcomed the agreement by the Government of the Republic of Angola to allow humanitarian deliveries wherever the need exists. The delegates call upon UNITA to accept the proposed United Nations plan immediately and begin implementation as soon as logistical arrangements can be completed. The observers call upon the international community to respond generously to the 3 June United Nations appeal.

The observers discussed potential actions that could be taken should UNITA continue to fail to respond to appeals that it end its military actions and return to the negotiations. At the same time the observers reiterated their full support for United Nations Security Council resolution 811 of 12 March, including paragraph 12 which appeals to all Member States to render economic, material and technical assistance to the Government of Angola for the reconstruction and development of the country. The observers will hold discussions with other United Nations Member States prior to the 15 July

deadline for the renewal of the mandate of UNAVEM II to coordinate possible actions within the United Nations.

The observers also reaffirmed that the key principles of the Bicesse Peace Accords, whose validity has been confirmed on numerous occasions by the Government of the Republic of Angola and UNITA, as well as the additional principles contained in the draft Memorandum of Understanding of the Abidjan Protocol to reinforce the Accords, are the best basis for a peaceful settlement. The observers expressed their readiness to:

- reactivate the monitoring and guarantee mechanisms of the Peace Accords,

- support the reinforcement of the role of the United Nations once agreement is reached on a comprehensive settlement, and

- consider means to ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches all people in need throughout Angola in a timely manner.

The delegations of Portugal and the Russian Federation would like to express their gratitude to the Government of the United States of America for its hospitality.

8 June 1993

Washington, D.C.
United States of America

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/25968
18 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 817 (1993) of 7 April 1993, in which it urged Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue to cooperate with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in order to arrive at a speedy settlement of their difference,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to resolution 817 (1993), together with the statement of the Government of Greece and the letter of the President of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia dated 27 and 29 May 1993 respectively (S/25855 and Add.1 and 2),

1. Expresses its appreciation to the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia for their efforts and commends to the parties as a sound basis for the settlement of their difference the proposals set forth in annex V to the report of the Secretary-General;

2. Urges the parties to continue their efforts under the auspices of the Secretary-General to arrive at a speedy settlement of the remaining issues between them;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on the progress of these further efforts, the objective of which is to resolve the difference between the two parties before the commencement of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, and to report to the Council on their outcome in good time, and decides to resume consideration of the matter in the light of the report.

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LETTER DATED 16 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit the enclosed eighth submission of the Government of the United States of America as requested by paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 771 (1992) and paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 780 (1992).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Madeleine K. ALBRIGHT

Annex

Supplemental United States Submission of Information to The United Nations Security Council In Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Resolution 771 (1992) and Paragraph 1 of Resolution 780 (1992) June 16, 1993

This is the eighth submission by the United States Government of information pursuant to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 771 (1992) relating to the violations of humanitarian law, including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, being committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. As in our previous reports, we have focused on grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and, in accordance with resolution 771, have provided information that is "substantiated," that is, which rests upon eyewitness testimony directly available to us or that includes detail sufficient for corroboration.

As with previous reports, we have tried to ensure that our collection effort has been even-handed and aimed at gathering information on crimes committed by all parties to the conflict. It should be noted, however, that access to independent sources within the territory of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro has proved very difficult, due to limitations imposed by authorities in those areas.

We have tried not to duplicate information provided to us from other countries and non-governmental sources, which we understand will submit reports pursuant to resolutions 771 and 780. We have not repeated individual accounts listed under one category, such as "willful killing," in other categories, such as "torture." The United States has further information substantiating the incidents included in this report, which we will make available on a confidential basis directly to the Commission of Experts, established under Security Council resolution 780 or, as appropriate, to the Prosecutor of the international Tribunal, established under Security Council resolution 827.

Resolution 827, which was adopted since our last submission, ensures that the UN Commission of Experts continues to pursue its work of conducting investigations, establishing a data base, and preparing evidence during the interim period before the appointment of the Tribunal's Prosecutor and hiring of staff to begin authoritative investigations and preparations for trial of persons responsible for violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia. We urge other countries to continue to submit information on a regular basis to the Commission during this interim period and to join us in making financial contributions to the Commission to facilitate its important work.

In accordance with paragraph 1 of resolution 780, the United States intends to continue providing information that comes into our possession. As in our previous reports, the notations at the end of each of the items indicate the source from which the information was drawn.

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Enclosure

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA:
GRAVE BREACHES OF THE FOURTH GENEVA CONVENTION

EIGHTH SUBMISSION

WILLFUL KILLING

Apr-May 93 Bosnian Croatian and Muslim forces attacked civilians of each other's ethnic group in Vitez, executing entire families in their homes, from April 15, 1993, for about a week. According to the British commander of the UN troops:

> "The soldiers have seen some things that will mark them for life -- children held in the arms of their mothers and both of them shot. Reports of atrocities are correct. Whole families have been killed. We do not know who is doing this -- the bodies do not have names on them."

In Vitez, Bosnian Croat soldiers went from house to house executing Muslims. Some women were murdered as they were taking in the laundry. Multiple rapes by Bosnian Croat soldiers in the Vitez area has also been confirmed. A 36-year-old Muslim refugee, who was shot in the arm, said:

> "They are shooting every day, every hour, every moment."

On the outskirts of Travnik, a Muslim military police unit attacked Croatian civilians, driving them from their homes.

In Konjic, Croat militiamen engaged in house-to-house fighting.

In Santici, Bosnian Croat gunmen killed villagers and livestock; they burned houses and the village mosque. An UNPROFOR officer described the activity:

> "Fifteen or 20 (Bosnian Croat militiamen) lobbed grenades through the front windows of Muslim houses, then waited for the people to bolt out the door and shot them."

In Ahinici, UNPROFOR officials discovered charred bodies in Muslim homes that had been torched by Bosnian Croat gunmen. As of May 4, the Ahinici death toll had reached 103. According to the EC Monitoring Mission in Zenica:

> "It was a large-scale massacre, organized and well planned."

(The Washington Post) (The New York Times) (London Press Association) (Paris AFP)

24 Apr 93 Residents of Miletici, a village located north of Vitez and consisting of 11 houses, were attacked by a band of locally-based Muslims.

The Miletici village men attempted to defend their houses and, during the short and mismatched gun battle, killed one of the "mujahideen" soldiers. According to eyewitnesses interviewed by a UNHCR field worker:

> "The (Muslim) gunmen maintained that each one of them was worth five villagers. They'd already killed one, so they took four men between the ages of 20 and 40 into a house, held them there, tied up the rest of the villagers, returned to the house to torture and execute the four men." (Department of State) (Reuters)

May 92 - Apr 93 Two Muslim former soldiers, aged 25 and 33, were released on April 21, 1993, after having been in a series of Serbian camps since their capture on May 30, 1992. Both had admitted to being soldiers when they were captured.

After their capture, the men were first sent to a camp in Vlasenica called Susica, where they were held for only a few days before being transferred to a prison in the same town where they remained for two months. They were then sent to a camp in Batkovic, where they remained for one month, then to two different camps in Doboj, where they were held for six months, until March 2, 1993. Finally, they were sent to a camp in Bijeljina, until their release on April 21.

The witnesses said Batkovic was the worst of the camps in which they had been held. There had been about 1,600 prisoners in Batkovic when they arrived, all of them from northeastern Bosnia. A number of children and elderly men were moved out of the camp in closed trucks after it was announced there would be an ICRC visit to the camp.

Beatings were common at Batkovic. Zulfo Saracevic, aged 55, died of beatings. A jeweler from Bijelina died after three nights of beatings, the purpose of which was to get him to tell where he had hidden gold and jewelry. Several elderly men died from the bad conditions at the camp. One of the witness's cousins died of gangrene in a leg wound for which he received no medical care.

On several occasions, they and other prisoners were forced to remove their clothes and perform sex acts on each other and on some of the guards. The two witnesses named the three worst guards, all Serbs from the Bijeljina area.

The witnesses, however, said that the very worst abuses were committed by a fellow Muslim prisoner from Gornja Tuzla, whose nickname was "Pupa." They described this Muslim as a "trustee" similar to the "Kapos" in German camps during World War II. The witnesses said that they had encountered other Muslim prisoners serving in the same capacity in other camps in which they had been held.

The two camps in Doboj were located in a commercial warehouse and in a warehouse at the Bare barracks. The men were not registered with the ICRC in either camp; the ICRC was not permitted to visit either camp during their time there. There were approximately 100 detainees in the two camps who were used as laborers to dig military trenches.

The witnesses said that two Serb camp managers in Doboj were "good men" who did not allow abuse of the prisoners. On weekends, however, when these two managers went home to visit their families, the prisoners were beaten. Those beatings were perpetrated by Serb prisoners who often received gifts, including alcohol, from their relatives on weekends. The Serb guards allowed these beatings but apparently did not participate. (Department of State)

Jul-Aug 92 A 30-year-old Bosnian Croatian from Brisevo witnessed the July 1992 movement of JNA forces through the area south of Prijedor and west of Ljubija. Meeting little or no resistance, these forces moved through each town and forced out the remaining inhabitants.

For about four days, JNA forces positioned mobile antiaircraft weapons on the top of a ridge about two and a half kilometers east of Ljubija. Antiaircraft guns were used to fire on unarmed refugees fleeing along the east slope of the ridge.

In mid-August, a bus arrived from Ljubija with about 20 Muslim prisoners, some from the area of Carakovo, southwest of Prijedor. They were removed from the bus with their hands tied with wire behind their necks and escorted by about 10 guards with assault weapons. After their hands were freed, the prisoners were forced to dig a pit.

The guards beat and shot them, then pushed their bodies into the pit. Before departing, the guards covered the bodies in the pit with dirt. During the last half of August, the witness could see human hands and feet protruding from the mound.

On about August 24, the area of Brisevo southwest of Prijedor was under attack by Yugoslav army mortars. After the mortar attack, infantry troops moved from village to village indiscriminately seeking out and killing inhabitants. Most people were hiding from the shelling in their basements where the soldiers killed them. Muslims buried about 70 bodies, all of which had suffered multiple bullet wounds. The following is a list of the locations of the graves of some of these 70 victims:

A. In Dimaci, on the west side of the paved road, alongside a small creek flowing towards Begac on the sloping field below the house of Stipe Dimaca. This grave contained the badly burned bodies of two males and one female.

B. In Mlinari, on the west side of the paved road from Dimaci to Buzuci, 10 meters behind the house of Ivitsa Mlinar. This grave contained six bodies, at least two of which were males.

C. About 400 meters west of Mlinari towards Groarac, a grave contained four male bodies with multiple bullet wounds. In the same immediate area about 10 meters from the well near the house of Marko Busuk, three males were buried. One had been severely tortured, and his eyes gouged out. The other two were invalids who had been shot.

D. On the east side of the paved road from Dimaci to Buzuci, approximately 150 meters northwest of the site described above in C, was the grave of a woman.

E. On the west bank of the Stare Nitsa, about 450 meters downstream from the grave described in F, uphill from an old water mill, and among some young "breza" trees, an unidentified man.

F. The grave of Ilija Atlija, about 400 meters southwest of the grave site described above in E, on the north side of the Stare Nitsa stream, five meters to the right of the front of the house of Ilija Atlija.

G. The grave of a man who died from knife wounds, located across the road from a small church that had burned, 300 meters from where the stream joins the road, and behind the house of Jozo Jakara.

H. The site of two graves, 200 meters from the road south of Lisina near the house of Sreco Ivandic. One grave held the remains of four males and one female; the other contained the bodies of three males and one female. The two graves were about 70 meters apart.

I. Graves of two 16-year-old males, located on the Zunica Ravana road northwest of Buzuci, near the church, along a small stream flowing 30 meters from the house of Kata Zunica. One boy was buried on the south side of the stream; the other buried on its north side. Their bodies bore identification stating they were from Rizvanovici. (Department of State)

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6 Aug 92 A 45-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Sanski Most witnessed the arrival at Manjaca camp of a convoy carrying 1,300 prisoners from Omarska, and the murder of 15-20 of these men during the lunch hour. Camp guards beat the men to death with wooden boards, bats, and thick electrical cables. Three of the victims were stabbed repeatedly and their throats were cut. The witness identified Jakupovic and Dedo Crnalnic as two of the casualties. (Department of State)

Jul-Aug 92 A 26-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Donja Puharska, a suburb of Prijedor, Bosnia, was imprisoned in Omarska camp on July 13, 1992, and transferred to Manjaca camp on August 6, where he remained until December 19.

On July 13, all of Muslim men remaining in Donja Puharska were arrested and taken to the Omarska camp. On July 21, the witness was transferred to a building called the "white house," where he was kept for seven days. A Serbian irregular came into the "white house" on July 26 and declared that he had come from the front, where nine Serbian soldiers had been killed. The irregular stated that three Muslim men would be killed for each of the Serbian soldiers and that he would return at midnight to kill them.

He returned after midnight with a soldier and a truck. The irregular and the soldier entered the room where the 50-60 men were held, grabbed one prisoner, and took him outside. The prisoners heard the sounds of beating and screams for help. The two men returned and grabbed another prisoner and the same thing happened. The irregular and the soldier came back and took one man each time until they had taken 27 prisoners. At 5:00 am, they came and asked for four volunteers to load the dead bodies on the truck.

On July 27, the witness was called out by two soldiers and taken for interrogation to an upstairs room in the same building, where five men beat him with objects that included a policeman's stick, a whip, a rubber stick, a square metal stick, and a metal ball on a chain. The man with the metal stick kept hitting the witness on the legs and after a while his legs grew numb and he felt no pain in them.

Omarska camp contained a building called the "red house," where victims were killed with knives. The witness saw dead bodies outside the "red house" each day, some missing arms or legs, and said the stench was unbearable.

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On August 6, some of the prisoners were transferred by bus to a camp in Manjaca. Upon arrival, the witness saw guards kill a man named Dzusin. The guards had called him from the bus, took him about 10 meters away, made him kneel, and cut his throat. (Department of State)

Jul 92 A 45-year-old Muslim witnessed, from his house in Visegard, the systematic butchering of about 450 Muslims on a bridge over the Drina River.

On July 11, 1992, a Volkswagen Passat drove backwards on to the "stone bridge" over the Drina and stopped in the middle. The blue-gray car, which had come from the direction of the city center, was cramped with six Muslims and at least one armed Serb. Another group of "chetniks" was already waiting for them on the bridge.

The man in charge of this group was a well-known Serb from Arandjelovac or Kraljevo, Serbia. He announced over a megaphone to "Muslims hiding in the surrounding woods," that they would have a "bloody bajram (holiday) Balkan style." He also announced that "every Serb who protects a Muslim will be killed immediately," and that for every Serb killed by a Muslim, a thousand Muslims would be sacrificed.

The group then cut off the heads of the six prisoners, a process that took about three minutes. The time was about 4:15 pm. They threw the bodies into the Drina River. About a half hour later, a van arrived with another eight Muslims. They were killed in the same manner. Women and children were included in a third group that was brought to the bridge about 7:00 pm. The killing went on through much of the night.

The massacre continued the following day. Victims included a dentist named Dervis, Alia Selac, and Alia's father. At least 20 "chetniks" participated in the slaughter on the second day. The witness estimates at least 450 people were killed on the bridge over three or four days. (Department of State)

Jul 92 A 68-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Lakat, Bosnia, witnessed the killing of 19 elderly Bosnian Muslims in Borci and on Borasnica mountain, near Konjic, by Bosnian Serb forces on July 9-10, 1992.

On June 28, the Bosnian Muslim residents of Lakat fled their village. Only 20 elderly Bosnian Muslim men and women residents chose to remain. On the morning of July 8, two Bosnian Serbs, also from Lakat, announced that remaining Bosnian Muslims would be evacuated by bus to Buscak where they would be exchanged. That evening, they were put on a military truck destined for Pridvorci.

Two armed guards were stationed in the back of the truck with the prisoners. After going through Pridvorci, the truck continued north for another 10 kilometers to Luka where they stopped. The prisoners were transfered to a two-ton truck that took them to Borci where the prisoners were put in the basement of a building. There had been three other Bosnian Muslim prisoners inside the basement.

The next morning, July 9, the door to the basement was opened and the prisoners were ordered to come out in pairs. After the first two prisoners walked out, they were met by 10 guards who beat them and questioned them about the whereabouts of their sons. The second pair of prisoners, including Osman Demic, was then called. During the questioning his right ear was cut off and the other prisoner was beaten unconscious.

Then the third pair was called out. Halil Golos was one of these men. During the questioning, one of his ears was cut off. From the next pair, Salko Demic was beaten to death. From the following pair, Ahmed Hrnicic was also beaten to death. After all the prisoners had been questioned, those who were still alive were taken back to the basement. That same night, four guards returned to the basement and removed Ibro Kajan, his wife Hava Kajan, and Osman Demic. Once outside, the three were lined up and executed.

On the morning of July 10, the prisoners were removed from the basement and ordered to load the bodies of Salko Demic, Ahmed Hrnicic, Osman Demic, Ibro Kajan, and Hava Kajan onto the back of a waiting truck. The guards ordered all to lie down in the back of the truck. The guards killed 80-year-old Urija Golos because she did not lie down quickly enough.

The two vehicles then traveled about 15 kilometers to Borasnica Mountain (Borasnica Planina) in Konjic County (Konjic Obcine), where they stopped on the road. The prisoners were ordered to throw down all the bodies from the vehicle, and then to get out and carry the bodies off the road. When all the bodies and prisoners were about 25 meters from the road, the guards opened fire on the prisoners, killing all except the witness, whom they presumed was also dead. (Department of State)

Jun-Aug 92 A 38-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Gacko, Bosnia, was interned by Bosnian Serb forces at Bileca camp until August 18, 1992.

On June 1, Bosnian Serb forces detained about 110 Bosnian Muslim and Croatian males in Gacko, Bosnia, until June 5 when they were transferred to the processing center located in the basement of the Samacki Hotel on the southeast end of Gacko.

On June 18, after Bosnian Serb forces had announced that the Bosnian Muslim and Croatian residents could leave the town, a convoy with approximately 100 men, women, and children left Gacko and headed toward neighboring Montenegro. Approximately seven kilometers south of Gacko, near the Kosuta Motel in Zborna Gomila, the convoy was intercepted by Serbian irregulars from the "White Eagles" paramilitary organization. All able-bodied males were segregated from the rest of the convoy and ordered to lie down on the road. They were searched individually for valuables. The women and children were then loaded on several military trucks and returned to Gacko. The men were placed on two military trucks and taken to the Secretariat for Internal Affairs (SUP) building in Gacko. After the prisoners were interrogated and tortured by two inspectors, they were transferred to the basement of Samacki Hotel.

From June 18 to July 1, the witness identified the following prisoners who were killed at the processing center in the Samaki Hotel:

Osman Omanovic, about 60, from Domanovic;
Mirsad Dzeko, about 35, from Gacko;
Arif Jaganjac, about 60, from Gacko;
Miralem Voloder, about 32, from Gacko;
Edin Sahovic, about 37, from Gacko;
Latif Halilovic, about 42, worked in Gacko;
Aziz Fazlagic, about 41, from Gacko.

On July 1, about 140 detainees were loaded onto four military trucks. While they were boarding the trucks, 55-year-old Aziz Hasanbegovic, who was unable to get on the truck because of his weight, was shot and killed. Two other prisoners were also killed: 33-year-old Senad Memic from Gacko, whose throat was slashed; and 17-year-old Enver Redzovic, from Gacko, who was stabbed in the stomach. Their bodies were loaded onto the trucks.

The convoy with the prisoners arrived in Bileca about two hours later. Prisoners were forced to walk between two rows of guards who beat them as they passed. Prisoners were placed in one of the basements where another group of approximately 200 prisoners were already confined. Prisoners were not fed nor allowed to go to the restrooms for the next three days. They were indiscriminately beaten every day with large wooden and metal sticks by groups of some 10 guards until the guards tired and could no longer beat them.

The following prisoners were beaten to death between July 2-4:

Sabit Saric, about 52, from Gacko;
Sevko Catovic, about 28, from Gacko;
Adem Ramic, about 70, from Gacko;
Zecer Krvavac, about 80, from Gacko.

On August 10, the prisoners were taken upstairs for an interview conducted by Radivoje Gutic from the Bosnian Serbian News Agency (SRNA) and Fnu Vulacic from Belgrade Television, in the presence of Red Cross officials. Days prior to this interview, the prisoners were allowed for the first time to take a shower and shave. After the interview was over, the prisoners were taken to the interrogation and torture room and were tortured for telling the truth about the conditions and treatment received at the camp. These tortures continued until August 18 when 378 prisoners from the camp were exchanged in Stolac, Bosnia. (Department of State)

May-Aug 92 A 35-year-old Muslim from Prijedor was held prisoner by Bosnian Serbs from May 30 until August 13, 1992, nearly all of this time at Omarska camp.

Upon his arrival at Omarska on May 30, he and his fellow prisoners were immediately ordered to stand with their hands against a wall while they were beaten with sticks and other objects. At the beginning of his captivity, the witness regularly saw people beaten badly, often until they died, near the entrance of the camp's administration building.

The worst beatings occurred after Serbs from the area were killed in combat. Following the death of six local "chetniks," for example, guards put a mixture of oil and water on the ground to trip up prisoners. Those who fell were beaten badly.

One evening, about halfway through his stay at Omarska, the witness saw a prisoner in the kitchen standing on a chair and complaining about "chetniks." A Serb soldier, after warning him to sit down, shot into the crowd, killing the man and wounding four other prisoners. The witness said he could identify the guard who had done the shooting.

During his imprisonment, the witness saw at least 10 to 15 prisoners beaten to death between the interrogation area of the second floor of the administration building and the building's entrance. One of the victims, Rizah Hadzalic, was a personal acquaintance. Every night people were taken out of their bunk facilities: five, 10, sometimes 15. Some came back badly beaten; many never came back. (Department of State)

May-Jul 92 A 30-year-old Muslim was evicted from his family home in Kozarac by Serb militia on May 26, 1992.

On the way from Kozarac to imprisonment at Tronopolje, a group of Serbs threatened to kill him, his father, his brother, and three neighbors. The Serbs lined them against a building wall and cocked their rifles, but were stopped by an anonymous Serb commander. Instead of being shot, they were beaten -- in the case of the witness, until his ribs were broken. Later along the route, the witness tried to help an elderly woman who could no longer walk. A Serb soldier ordered him to let her go, and then shot the woman to death.

Also along the route, inside Kozarac, the witness saw armed Serbs, whom he knew, gun down the following five men: Ismet Karabasic, Sejdo Karabasic, Ekrem Karabasic (all brothers), Ekrim Basic, and Edin Basic.

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The witness was held inside a school in Tronopolje from where he regularly observed through a window guards taking women from a movie theater. During both the day and the evening, on at least 20 different occasions, he saw the women taken either to the courtyard or to the playing field where they were raped. The men were usually drunk. He said that there were many witnesses who could see what was happening. The women usually were returned afterward to the movie house. (Department of State)

Jun 92 A 44-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Vlasenica, Bosnia, who was captured by Serbian forces on June 24, 1992, in Vlasenica, was sent to a prison camp in the Susica River Valley where he witnessed numerous atrocities committed by local Bosnian Serb troops. The witness knew several key personalities at the camp responsible for atrocities. He was later transferred to a prison in Batkovic on June 30, where he remained until February 20, 1993.

On April 17, 1992, the first Serbian troops entered the village of Vlasenica. The troops that initially occupied the village were from Novi Sad, Serbia, and were led by an unidentified lieutenant colonel who held a megaphone and demanded that all Muslim residents surrender their weapons and insisted that no harm would come to them.

The troops from Novi Sad left on May 2 when Bosnian Serb troops from Sekovici, Bosnia, took over the town. Local Serbian troops from Vlasenica also assisted the other troops with the occupation of their village. Over the course of five weeks, the troops captured residents of Vlasenica at random, took them to the police station for beatings, and then released them.

On June 24, local Serbian troops evacuated about 50 Muslim families who lived on a street in Vlasenica called Ulica Zarka Vukovica. After the evacuation, five houses were set ablaze and the men, women, and children were forced to walk to a prison camp in the Susica River Valley, located a few hundred meters from the town's main street. The camp was located on the west side of the highway leading to Han Pijesak. Soon after the residents from Vlasenica arrived on June 24, Durmo Handzic and Asim Zildzic, who had been taken to the camp earlier, died from injuries sustained from beatings suffered on June 22.

In the early morning hours of June 26, a reign of terror began at the Susica camp. At 1:00 a.m., two Serbian guards entered the warehouse and forced four men, including Muharam Kolarevic and Rasid Ferhatbegovic, outside. Immediately thereafter, four gun shots were heard outside the warehouse accompanied by screaming from the four men. At 1:30 a.m., two Serbian brothers from Vlasenica went into the warehouse and took three women away and raped them. Soon after daybreak, two brothers were selected to dispose of the four corpses. The men buried the victims in a grave near the camp.

Food was virtually non-existent at Susica camp. Each person was given only one slice of bread for a 24-hour period. As the summer progressed, soup was occasionally given in addition to bread. Prisoners commonly lost consciousness from malnutrition. No exception was made for women or children. The witness's 65-year-old uncle died of starvation. Prisoners who had to use the bathroom were forced to run to a toilet outside during which time another prisoner was given a stick and forced to beat the individuals while they were defecating or urinating.

On June 30, several prisoners were moved from the Susica camp to one in Batkovic, located approximately 10 kilometers north of Bijeljina, Bosnia. As the men from Susica got off the bus, they were beaten. From the very first day, everyone was subjected to harsh beatings. Many of the guards at Batkovic were brutal men but the witness identified one of the worst, the man who killed Zulfo Hadziomerovic on July 4 by beating him to death. This guard used the stock of his machine gun to beat the prisoner about 10 times on that day. (Department of State)

May-Jul 92 A 31-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Prijedor, Bosnia, was a prisoner at Keraterm camp from May 31 to August 5, 1992.

On May 31, about 300 Muslim men were arrested in a new section of Prijedor located along the road to Bosanski Novi. Five buses took them at first to Omarska camp, then to Keraterm camp.

The harassment and beatings of prisoners began on June 2. Each night prisoners were taken out, beaten, and killed. Guards would come into the rooms, fire their rifles at the ceiling, and force some prisoners to swallow the empty shells of 7.62mm ammunition. During the day, the guards took the prisoners outside and made them walk on all fours and bark like dogs. The prisoners had to take off their clothes and sit on bottles. A particular guard, whom the witness identified, supervised these "games" and laughed.

On July 26, the witness saw buses loaded with people drive through the gate. The people were told to get off the buses and were separated into two groups. Each group had to go to a grass-covered area at the end of the building and form a circle. Camp guards were reinforced by a busload of "chetniks" who beat the men with bats wrapped in barbed wire and with broken bottles.

This continued for the rest of the night. Then the metal door to Room Number 3 was closed and the soldiers fired inside the room. The prisoners panicked, pressed against the locked door, opened it, and ran outside, where they were machine-gunned. The massacre continued until 5:00 am the next day.

At 11:00 am on July 27, a truck came for the bodies of both the dead and those that were still living. Seventy volunteers were taken to load the massacred people on the truck. There were 170 dead and 47 still alive. The dead were loaded first; the injured were loaded on top of them.

At 4:30 am on July 28, the guards fired again into Room Number 3 and killed 27 men. Banja Luka television reported that evening that there had been an escape attempt at Keraterm and that 27 prisoners were shot dead while trying to escape. On August 5, Keraterm was closed and the witness was returned to Prijedor where he remained until January 12, 1993. (Department of State)

May-Aug 92 A 34-year-old Bosnian Muslim told of his experiences at Keraterm and Omarska camp from late May to August 1992.

On May 26, Bosnian Serb soldiers arrested the witness on the road to Prijedor. They brought him to Keraterm for three days, then to Omarska. Upon his arrival at Omarska camp, he saw the beating death of 38-year-old Ahiz Dedic, a Muslim ex-policeman, by two men from a Bosnian Serb "special unit." After his own torture the next day -- he was beaten until he fainted -- the witness watched five "chetniks" stab Ikrem Alic to death.

The witness was moved to the "electricians' house" from where, about a month later, he watched as a man with his hands against the wall of another nearby building was beaten by camp guards until he almost fell. One of the guards then took a running jump from several meters, pouncing on the man's back and knocking him down. He then turned the victim over, cut his ears off, and then cut his throat. Another guard turned and killed the man with his revolver.

The witness saw the killing of about 30 men during his stay at Omarska. Among the victims whose names he knew were: Muharem Kahrimanovic, Emir Karabasic, Jasmin Hrnic, Avdo Mujkanovic, Islam Bahonjic, and Imeoca Grozdanic.

The most sadistic killings were of Hrnic and Karabasic. In the course of a horrible beating, they were forced to bite off each other's sexual organs. Before the final death blows, they were also forced to drink motor oil and chew on dead pigeons.

At the end of August or beginning of September, the witness was taken to Manjaca camp, where he spent half a month. During the trip, he witnessed the beating deaths of Nezir Krak and Dedo Crnic, and identified their killer. Outside Banja Luka, Serb children were encouraged to board the bus and beat the prisoners. (Department of State)

May-Jul 92 A 24-year-old Bosnian Muslim witnessed the "ethnic cleansing" of Kozarac and the Prijedor area from May 26 until his capture three days later. From his place of hiding in the woods, he witnessed the killing of Hasan and Zejna Alic; she was shot in the breast, her husband in the head. Two days later, the witness saw the same killer stab a young man, force him to walk away, and then shoot him.

The witness and his friends were captured by "chetniks" in the nearby woods on or about May 29. One of the young Serbs who caught him was a school friend who personally took charge of the witness and his brother, and arranged for them to change into civilian clothes taken from a nearby house. His Serb friend warned the two brothers not to admit to Serb prison authorities that they had been "fighters."

The witness was taken to Keraterm for the first night, then to Omarska. Upon arrival, he witnessed the killing of a detainee by a former taxi driver whom he identified. On June 1, he watched as a member of the "taxi driver's band" killed a Muslim named Jasmin Velic with a pickax. He also witnessed the slow death of Hasic Eno, who had been stabbed in the back and took five days to die.

During the witness's second month at Omarska, Azur Jakupovic arrived as a prisoner. With a ring in his nose (the kind used for pigs) and attached to a chain, Jakupovic was dragged into camp on his hands and knees by a young Serb soldier. The victim was naked from the waist up, which revealed a bloody Serb cross carved in his back. The guards announced to Muslim onlookers that this was the way Serbia's enemies would look. Jakupovic was then tossed onto a burning stack of truck tires where he died.

The witness said that such killings were often observed by three senior camp officials from the second floor of the administration building. He identified these camp officials. (Department of State)

May-Jun 92 A 26-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Divic, Bosnia, witnessed the "ethnic cleansing" of his village and atrocities in a Celopek detention facility, where he was detained from May 29 through June 29, 1992.

On May 29, all 174 male citizens of Divic were taken by bus to a movie theater that was part of a cultural center being used as a prison in the village of Celopek, located seven kilometers north of Zvornik.

On June 7, two Serbian soldiers from Kraljevo murdered Suljeman Kapidzic and Ramo Alihodzic as an example to all prisoners of what would happen if they didn't pay the guards 2,000 German marks immediately. The men collected amongst themselves enough German marks to pay the price.

On June 10, a 35-year-old Serbian soldier took seven pairs of fathers and sons from the group and forced them to walk onto the stage of the theater and disrobe. He forced the seven pairs to perform fellatio on one another while the other men were required to watch. While this was happening on the stage, the same soldier took Sakib Kapidzic and Zaim Pezerovic from the audience and ordered the men under his command to beat them until they were unconscious, and then ordered his men to stab their victims to death.

The soldier then took a semi-automatic rifle and shot randomly at the men on the stage and into the audience. He also approached a 16-year-old boy, Damir Bikic, and asked him to point out his father in the audience. He asked the father if he had any other male offspring. When the father replied that he did not, the soldier put a rifle in the boy's mouth and killed him. In this sequence of events, this particular soldier killed 10 men. (Department of State)

May-Jun 92 A 31-year-old Bosnian Muslim witnessed the JNA attack in late May 1992 and subsequent "ethnic cleansing" of the Muslim population of Sanski Most, Bosnia, and the destruction of their property. The witness spent 50 days as a prisoner in Sanski Most and then was imprisoned at the detention camp in Manjaca until mid-December 1992.

Between May 23 and 24, the JNA and its military police arrested the Muslim officials in the city government and members of the Muslim intelligentsia. On May 25 and 26, the JNA units attacked Muslims in Sanski Most by throwing grenades in their homes in the Muslim section, Mahala, and by firing at the houses with automatic weapons. This lasted one day, during which 11 persons were shot to death in a house on Muhici Street that belonged to a man named Hilmija. Of these, three were women, one of whom was pregnant, and five were young boys.

The men were taken to the local school; women and children were transported to Velika Kladusa. After the "cleansing," the Serbs continued to throw grenades into the houses, then burned them. The ruins were leveled with bulldozers. Local Serb platoon leaders, whom the witness identified, used their soldiers to carry out the destruction.

The men from the Muslim section of Sanski Most were held prisoner in the local school for 50 days, where there were 1,200 men and no toilet facilities. The men were beaten continuously and forced to beat each other. Frequently, Serbian irregulars armed with knives came to the school and demanded to kill the prisoners, but police guards would not let them in. (Department of State)

19 May 92 A 60-year-old Bosnian Muslim described the massacre of Muslim prisoners at a hunting lodge.

Bosnian Serbs in Metaljko detained the witness and drove him to Mostina detention facility, a hunting lodge in the woods between Metaljka and Cajnice. There were 50 Muslim men held inside the lodge and another six in a shipping container to which the witness was brought.

A Serb from the village of Stakorina, whom he identified, entered the lodge at about 5:00 pm and opened fire on the prisoners. The witness heard the firing last for about 10 minutes, then heard the man exit the lodge and continue shooting into the air until someone told him to calm down. He responded, "Take me down to Cajnice so I can kill them all."

He did not come to the shipping container where the witness was detained. (Department of State)

9 May 92 A Bosnian Muslim from Brcko witnessed the slaying of prisoners by Serbian guards at Luka camp on or about May 9, 1992.

Immediately upon his arrival at Luka, the witness saw a "chetnik" beat and kill two men from Zvornik. The incident happened at the door of the camp's warehouse, where the "in-processing" was taking place. The witness had been standing about 15 meters from the shooting.

The next day, the same man who had shot the men from Zvornik drove into camp with a woman named Ahmetovic, the sister of a Muslim ex-policeman whose whereabouts he was demanding to know. The "chetnik" pulled the woman from the car and beat her with a truncheon, asking again where her brother was hiding. After about 10 minutes, he took a shovel and hit her twice in the head, killing her.

During the same day, the witness also saw another Serb soldier beat and kill a 35-year-old Muslim man named Sead Cerimagic. The witness watched a total of five men get the same treatment from this soldier within an hour. (Department of State)

May 92 A 65-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Grapska, Bosnia, witnessed Serb irregular forces enter Sjenina and Grapska in May 1992, during which time residents were ordered to report to the hospital basement. Fearing internment, residents fled to the woods. Later, as they returned to their homes, they were rounded up by the irregular forces.

The soldiers ordered about 45 of them to dig a fresh grave in a cemetery near the mosque. Some of the victims attempted to resist but were shot on the spot. Those who dug the grave were subsequently killed with automatic weapons and pushed into the grave. After the massacre, the grave was filled in and leveled with earthmoving equipment.

Residents were told they would be taken to Doboj on buses, but were force-marched instead. Individuals periodically were pulled out of the march column, taken a short distance away, and shot. (Department of State)

Apr-May 92 A 64-year-old Bosnian Muslim witnessed the April 8, 1992, "ethnic cleansing" of Zvornik by Serbian irregular forces units, which was organized by the Zvornik chief of police.

The "chetniks" burned about 200 houses. As people were forced out of their houses, they were directed to stay in a group in front of a large house. Most of the "chetniks" wore scarves or ski masks to hide their faces. Two unidentified Muslim men were taken behind a house and shot. Two other Muslim men, Hammed Cirak and Salikh Dagdagan, were killed in their homes, after which the corpses were brought out and burned. In all, about 76 people were killed, mostly in their basements. Those who were gathered together were told that younger males must either join the Serbian forces, leave, or be shot. Elderly men, women, and children were allowed to stay.

After a few days, the elderly men from the Kula area were allowed to return to their houses. In mid-April, Serbian forces began using a bulldozer to dig large pits in the Muslim cemeteries southwest of Zvornik proper. The witness saw buses and trucks dumping an undetermined number of bodies into these pits up to three times a day. One of the cemeteries was called Kazambase. He often saw trucks loaded with bodies in Maly Zvornik, in the area of the stone quarry near the Drina Hotel.

In May, "chetnik" forces moved into Djulci. They shot 10 residents on sight as they moved into town, as well as another 50 people who had been hiding in a garage. (Department of State)

TORTURE OF PRISONERS

Dec 92 A 24-year-old Bosnian of mixed Croatian Muslim background, from Banja Luka, reported that he had been hiding in his apartment for eight months when he decided on December 25, 1992, to risk going outside. The witness took some comfort from the Serb mayor of Banja Luka's Christmas greeting to all Croats.

The witness was picked up almost immediately during a roundup of military age men by Serb military police on a bridge in the city district of Mejdan. Two of the bearded "chetniks" started beating and verbally abusing him after asking him why he was not fighting.

The witness was taken to a bus loaded with other prisoners. As prisoners were brought on to the bus, each was beaten with a truncheon. All the prisoners had their valuables taken from them. There were four buses carrying a total of about 200 prisoners. The families who gathered around the buses were told their men would be back in an hour.

The buses stopped at a police station and a military camp on the way to Manjaca. At both places, the men were beaten and interrogated. The witness identified several guards who beat prisoners regularly at Manjaca camp, from which he was released the next month. (Department of State)

Jun-Jul 92 A 45-year-old Bosnian Muslim from Sanski Most witnessed the arrival at Manjaca camp of several convoys:

On June 17, a group of 40-45 persons from Sanski Most arrived and were all beaten once they dismounted the trucks that had transported them.

On June 28, a group of 20-25 prisoners arrived, were beaten, and were immediately put in isolation.

On July 7, a group of about 550 persons was brought to Manjaca camp in two trailer trucks and a three-ton truck. About 24 were already dead when the trucks were unloaded.

The witness singled out the Manjaca "policemen" as the most cruel of the guard contingents. The witness was beaten daily and kept in solitary confinement. He recalls being beaten approximately 20 times. One of his beatings lasted from 4:00 pm until 9:30 pm. The witness identified many of the sadistic guards, including one nicknamed "Kostolomac" (or bone breaker). (Department of State)

ABUSE OF CIVILIANS IN DETENTION CENTERS

26 Mar 93 According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, during a visit on March 31 to Bosnian Serb-controlled Batkovic camp, delegates of the ICRC were informed that 17 detainees might have lost their lives on March 26 when the vehicle transporting them for work at the front was ambushed. Three surviving detainees were able to speak in private with the ICRC delegates.

The ICRC has observed in the past that detainees were being forced to work at the front line. The ICRC noted that to send detainees into a combat zone where they might come under fire is a violation of the provisions of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. The ICRC also reminded the parties to the conflict that they are responsible at all times for the detainees' safety, and that it is prohibited to compel detainees to do work of a military nature or destined to serve a military purpose. (International Committee of the Red Cross)

May-Jun 92 A 26-year-old Muslim, along with family members, was evicted from her family home in Kozarac by Serb militia on May 25, 1992.

After having been held three nights in a school in Trnopolje, she was moved to a local private Muslim home. In June, she was able to visit the school each day to bring food to her husband and brother. During these visits, she regularly saw Serbs who had been neighbors roaming the camp (the school and its grounds) and beating prisoners. The first person on a list of Serbs she identified as participants in those beatings was once a classmate of hers.

On her last night in Trnopolje, about June 25, she along with other women and children were moved to the movie theater. There were about 500 to 600 women and children inside. At about 10:00 pm, two men arrived and picked out three women. There were about 10 other Serb men waiting for them outside. At about 6:00 or 7:00 am, one of three women returned to the movie theater, holding the wall with one hand and her stomach with the other, bent over, with swollen face, black and blue marks, crying. The other two women were never seen again. (Department of State)

IMPEDING DELIVERY OF FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

11 Jun 93 Bosnian Croat forces set up roadblocks and mines on a mountain road going through Nova Bila, stalling a humanitarian aid convoy that was moving east from central Bosnia. According to an UNPROFOR spokesperson:

> "The ill-fated convoy then met with further resistance when 24 of the trucks were stopped at Nova Bila and hit by mortars." (Reuters)

1 Jun 93 Bosnian Serb forces turned back UNHCR humanitarian aid convoys for the eastern Bosnian enclaves of Gorazde and Srebrenica. The Srebrenica convoy was stopped at the border crossing at Zvornik without explanation; the Gorazde convoy was stopped by local Bosnian Serb officials in Sekovici who told them "to get the hell out."

Bosnian Serb forces surrounding Srebrenica continued to prevent access by UN specialists to the town's water purification system. The regular water supply was contaminated and could not be restored without such access, and springs were running dry. (Department of State)

May-Jun 93 "Renegade forces" of Bosnian Croat and Muslim armies have planted mines along roads used primarily for humanitarian aid convoys and journalists. (The Washington Times)

28 May 93 Bosnian Muslim gunmen fired on a humanitarian aid convoy of Russian vehicles and drivers on the road between Pale and Sarajevo. (Department of State)

24 May 93 Bosnian Croat gunmen prevented a UN humanitarian aid convoy from delivering food to the Muslim village of Kruscica. The convoy was forced to return to Vitez, where it had distributed food to Croats earlier in the day. (Reuters)

20 May 93 Bosnian Muslim forces barred an UNPROFOR convoy access to the Croatian village of Kostajnica, in the Konjic district. The convoy was required to return to Jablanica. (Department of State)

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17 May 93 Bosnian Serb forces fired on Muslims attempting to collect air-dropped humanitarian aid supplies inside a UN-declared "safe area" in eastern Bosnia. According to a spokesperson for UNPROFOR:

> "In Srebrenica air-dropped relief bundles have been landing near the line of confrontation and Serb forces have fired upon some residents as they tried to retrieve them." (Reuters)

13 May 93 Bosnian Croat forces barred the UNHCR from delivering food and other supplies to about 1,475 Muslim civilians detained at Rodic military camp, near the Mostar's heliodrome. The Bosnian Croats on May 9, 1993, had forcibly transported more than 1,000 Muslim woman and children out of Mostar.

Conditions at the camp were extremely uncomfortable but not life-threatening. While isolated cases of abuse appear to have occurred during detention, most detainees volunteered that they were being treated well by their jailers, even describing them as kindly and concerned for the detainees' welfare. In general, the main difficulties facing the detainees were extreme over-crowding, insuffient food, and inadequate hygiene. (Department of State) (The New York Times) (Los Angeles Times)

12 May 93 An UNPROFOR helicopter was struck by a single small arms round from an unknown location following the evacuation of some 35 wounded from Zepa, forcing it to make an emergency landing about seven kilometers east of Trodor. (Department of State)

11 May 93 A Spanish UNPROFOR lieutenant was seriously wounded in the neck, arms, and leg while trying to move blood and medical supplies into Mostar during fighting between Bosnian Croatians and Muslims. (Reuters)

10 May 93 Bosnian Croat forces (HVO) assaulted a UNHCR humanitarian assistance convoy in Prozor. HVO soldiers pulled the Bosnian drivers from their trucks and beat them. Four drivers were injured and six vehicles were damaged extensively. (Department of State)

27 Apr 93 Unidentified forces wounded a British aid worker and a Bosnian driver when they shelled a humanitarian assistance convoy three kilometers north of Visoko on the road to Zenica. The shelling also damaged another truck in the convoy, which was returning empty from Tuzla. (Paris AFP)

30 Apr 93 Bosnian Serb forces continued to prohibit doctors from entering Srebrenica, and specifically turned back a team of physicians from Medecins Sans Frontieres, which had attemped to accompany a UNHCR convoy. The medical situation in Srebrenica deteriorated; scabies was rampant, particularly among children. (Department of State)

19 Apr 93 A UNHCR humanitarian assistance convoy was stoned while traveling through Bosnian Serb-held territory on the way to Srebrenica. Despite protective steel grills over the windshields, several truck windshields were broken and two drivers were injured. UNHCR reported that blocks weighing 15-20 pounds were thrown at the trucks.

In recent instances, Bosnian Serb police have stood by and watched as youths pelted the UNHCR trucks from elevated embankments as they drove past. UN convoys going to Tuzla also encountered instances of stoning. (Department of State)

DELIBERATE ATTACKS ON NON-COMBATANTS

8 Jun 93 Bosnian Muslim militiamen fired machine guns at Bosnian Croat civilians as they ran from their homes in Guca Gora, a village northeast of Travnik, according to UN peacekeeping officials. UN troops saw Muslims shooting civilians as they fought from house to house, and confirmed that hundreds of Croat civilians had died as a result of the Muslim action. A UN spokesperson said:

> "There is strong evidence of atrocities. For example, a door forced, apparently kicked open, and the civilian occupant found dead in the garden, shot in the head." (Department of State) (The Washington Post) (The New York Times) (Reuters)

4 Jun 93 A mortar attacked one of four buses carrying 95 Muslim and Croatian men, women, and children to Tuzla, at a Croatian forces checkpoint south of Vitez, in an area where Muslims and Croatians were fighting each other. The mortar killed two of the passengers and injured an Austrian humanitarian aid worker, Jasmin Arzberger. (Reuters)

2 Jun 93 An unidentified sniper killed Dominique Lonneux, a Belgian journalist working for a Mexican television service, while he was traveling with a UN humanitarian aid convoy that was traveling near near Dreznica, outside Mostar. The car in which Lennox was traveling was clearly marked "TV." (Paris AFP)

1 Jun 93 Bosnian Serb mortar crews shelled a soccer game in the Sarajevo suburb of Dobrinja where about 200 Bosnians, celebrating a Muslim holiday, were watching the game. The attack killed at least 11 people and wounded at least 80, about 25 of those with life-threatening injuries.

Bosnian Serbs shelled a 12-truck humanitarian aid convoy carrying food and heading for Maglaj, killing five -- including two Danish drivers -- and wounding seven, some seriously. According to a UNPROFOR statement:

> "Three things are very clear. This has been a deliberate attack on an UNHCR convoy. The attack was from the direction of Serbian-held territory, and tank rounds were used."

Snipers seriously wounded two French soldiers who were guarding Sarajevo airport; one sustained serious head injuries. (Department of State) (The Washington Post) (The New York Times) (Paris AFP) (Los Angeles Times) (The Washington Times)

29 May 93 A gang of about 30 gunmen, wearing Bosnian Army uniforms with Muslim insignia, shot and killed three Italian humanitarian assistance workers on the road between Gorni Vakuf and Novi Travnik, northeast of Split, at a place known as the "fish hatchery."

They were in a group of five Italians who had been transporting food in Bosnia with the Food for Aid organization, pulled from their vehicles, and robbed. The two survivors stated on June 1 in Grnica that the gunmen had fired at their feet as they ran from the ambush. The perpetrators of this crime are still unknown. (Department of State) (The Washington Times) (Reuters) (API)

21 May 93 Bosnian Serb forces fired on Sarajevo, killing four people and wounding more than 30, many of them children. The wounded included Deputy Prime Minister Zlatko Lagumdzija, who was shot in the leg. (API) (Reuters)

25 Apr 93 A UN Security Council mission to Srebrenica called the Muslim enclave "an open jail" where Serbian forces were planning "slow-motion genocide." Serbian nationalist forces had cut off water and electricity supplies to Srebrenica, reportedly in retaliation for similar actions against Serbian villages earlier in the war, when the Muslims still controlled the source. (The New York Times)

22 Apr 93 Gunfire from Croat troops near Gospic killed a Slovak member of UNPROFOR and wounded another peacekeeper. Another attack hit a Czech and Slovak UNPROFOR control point near Licki Osik. Fog made it difficult to determine whether this shelling had come from either the Croatian or Serbian forces. (API) (Paris AFP)

16 Apr 93 Unknown assailants launched a mortar attack that killed a Ukrainian soldier with the UN peacekeeping force while he was on patrol in the Grahoviste district of Sarajevo. (Reuters)

12 Apr 93 Serb nationalist forces shelled Srebrenica twice on April 12, once from 2:15 pm to 3:20 pm, and the second time from 3:50 pm to 4:10 pm. Most or all of the dead were civilians, including 15 children.

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Rounds fell first at the north end of town and proceeded toward the south end of town. At least 14 children were found dead in the school yard, where they had been playing football.

During the next barrage of direct shelling, a child of about six years of age was decapitated. The UNHCR representative who witnessed these attacks said:

> "I will never be able to convey the sheer horror of the atrocity I witnessed on April 12. Suffice it to say that I did not look forward to closing my eyes at night for fear that I would relive the images of a nightmare that was not a dream."

As of April 13, total casualties in the town of Srebrenica were 56 dead and approximately 100 wounded. A senior UN official in Zagreb called the Srebrenica shelling a violation of international conventions prohibiting attacks on civilian targets. "It is an atrocity," he said. (Department of State) (API) (The Washington Post) (The New York Times)

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OTHER, INCLUDING MASS FORCIBLE EXPULSION DEPORTATION OF CIVILIANS, MASS GRAVES, AND WANTON DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY

9 Jun 93 Bosnian Serbs have detained hundreds of Croat males from the Travnik area at Manjaca camp. (Department of State)

20 May 93 UN personnel discovered that both Bosnian Croats and Muslims were practicing "ethnic cleansing" in the southern Bosnian city of Mostar. According to a UNHCR spokesperson:

> "Most of the ethnic cleansing is being done by the Croats, (but) there is evidence of Croatians being forced out of the Muslim area in Mostar also." (Paris AFP)

11 May 93 Bosnian Croat forces used a large military ambulance -- marked with the distinctive red cross -- to move more than a dozen armed soldiers and a recoilless rifle into the Mostar area. (The New York Times)

11 May 93 Bosnian Serb forces reopened a former prison camp, the ceramics factory at Keraterm, where they detained a large group of Muslim men from Prijedor. A Serbian civil servant, who had confirmed the action, said the Muslims were to be used as hostages in case of US military intervention. After a few days, some of the men were released after relatives had paid a ransom; many more reportedly remained. (Department of State) (Hamburg DPA)

7 May 93 Bosnian Serbs blew up the 1587 Ferhad-Pasha mosque and the 1587 Arnaudija mosque, both located in Banja Luka. Yugoslav President Cosic issued a statement calling the bombing an "act of barbarity" and "the final warning to all reasonable and responsible people on all warring sides to act resolutely, immediately and with all means at their disposal to stop the war and destruction." (The New York Times)

May 93 According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the civilian population in Banja Luka is under constant pressure by armed groups who repeatedly beat, rob, and threaten persons belonging to minorities. The houses of such persons in Banja Luka and nearby villages are regularly attacked and burned by uncontrolled elements.

On May 2, a local Red Cross office in Banja Luka was destroyed by fire. On May 6, three mosques in Banja Luka were severely damaged by explosives. (International Committee of the Red Cross)

3 May 93 Bosnian Serbs expelled about 230 Muslim men, women, and children from Banja Luka. The Muslims, who were sent by bus through the Serbian lines at Turbe to Travnik, were required to pay 100 German marks for each adult and 50 marks for each child prior to departure, and to sign away all their property. (Reuters) (Paris AFP)

Mar 93 After having been detained in Bosnian Serb camps almost continuously from May through September 1992, a 42-year-old Bosnian Muslim was released upon the intervention of an influential Serbian friend.

The witness was not permitted to return to his home in Brcko, which had been "cleansed" of Muslims and Croatians, but forced to move to Bijeljina where he resided until mid-March 1993.

During this time, Bosnian Serb military and civilian authorities exercised great pressure on the Muslim and Croatian population to resettle elsewhere. All Muslims lost their jobs and were subject to a curfew and to searches of their homes. They had no income and were not allowed to sell any of their property.

On March 14, 1993, two days before the witness's departure from the area, the Serbs blew up all six mosques in Bijeljina, completely destroying them. Subsequently, they removed all the remains and plowed over the area. By chance, the BBC learned of the razing of the mosques and was able to film the debris of one before it could be cleared away. (Department of State)

1992-93 A 42-year-old Muslim described the leaders of the "exchange committee" for prisoners of war and civilian prisoners in Brcko.

The witness also described "mafia-like" organizations run by the "Arkanovci" to enrich themselves. One group, for example, controlled the bridge over the Sava River in Bosanska Raca, located 20 kilometers north of Bijeljina, where they demanded payment of 500-800 German marks for each Bosnian who wanted to cross the bridge to Serbia. Groups of other military irregulars operated similar "services" across the Drina River, east of Bijeljina.

In addition to controlling the bridges, Serbians also operated small boats. For a fee of up to 1,000 German marks for each person, and with the knowledge of local authorities, Muslims willing to resettle were transported across the river by the Serbs. Each group of Serbs (e.g., the "Arkanovci," "Draganovci," etc.) controlled their own territory and refrained from infringing on the territory of others. Under the guise of aiding the "voluntary resettlement" of the Muslims, Serbs robbed them of their last coin. Many people at all levels were involved in these practices. (Department of State)

May-Jun 92 A 45-year-old Bosnian Muslim witnessed the "ethnic cleansing" of Sanski Most.

Serbian authorities expelled all Bosnian Muslims from the local police forces by April 1992. Similarly, the locally stationed JNA detachments were purged of Muslims. By sometime in April, the Serbian-controlled militia demanded that all Sanski Most inhabitants turn in their weapons to the police.

On May 26-28, 1992, Sanski Most was subjected to intense bombardment. Up to 400 buildings were destroyed and all the mosques were dynamited. On May 27, the bombardment temporarily stopped and Muslims were told to gather in a field so they could be "protected" from the incoming fire. Approximately 2,000 people left their houses, reported to the authorities, and went to a sports arena. Once there, they were told to return to their homes and raise white flags over their houses to show they had no weapons and had "surrendered." About 3,000 Muslims were displaced in this phase of "cleansing."

The witness described some of the detention facilities in Sanski Most: the Betoniarka concrete factory, the Hasan Kikic school, the Gradska Dworana (used to house women), the Narodni Front shcool, and the Krinc factory. Additionally, people were locked in pigsties.

Up to four shifts of guards worked each day at Betoniarka, where the witness was detained. He recognized men from the civil militia, the Serbian reservist militia, and paramilitary groups, who administered beatings continuously. Some names of victims of these beatings were read off lists, others were former inhabitants from villages where Serbs had suffered casualties, and some were victims of private vendettas. (Department of State)

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May 92 A 60-year-old Bosnian Muslim described the "ethnic cleansing" of his village of Borajno, which is located in the Cajnice district.

On May 10, Serbian forces from Plejvlja, across the border in Montenegro, came to Borajno asking everyone to surrender their weapons. On May 16, the soldiers ordered the Muslims to move to the other side of the village, at which time the Serbs bombed the empty houses. The next morning, the soldiers began shooting in the air and, by 3:00 pm, the commander of one of the local Serbian units ordered the Muslim to leave the village.

The villagers ran into the woods. Immediately thereafter, the Serbian forces started bombing the woods from the mountains. The witness was able to return to Borajno on May 18, but he found the village deserted. (Department of State)

Apr-May 92 A 50-year-old Bosnian Muslim witnessed the occupation of Doboj by some of Arkan's paramilitary groups. Some of these troops were native Serbs; others were from the Knin region in Croatia.

When the paramilitary forces first took over Doboj, they set up artillery next to the health center and shelled the city's two mosques and Roman Catholic church, setting them on fire. They ordered Croats and Muslims to remain indoors while they searched their homes, often arresting the men. The soldiers "inflicted terrible beatings" on some residents, and looted and burned during their forays, which continued until August. (Department of State)

Apr 92 A Bosnian Muslim in her mid-thirties witnessed the bombardment of Zvornik by Yugoslav National Army (JNA) forces, the Serbs' rounding up of Muslim citizens, and their looting of Muslim homes.

In the beginning of April, the Serbian community began evacuating many of its citizens from Zvornik. On April 8, the witness saw Serbian snipers shooting at Muslim homes from apartments that had been vacated by local Serbs. JNA forces placed barricades in town.

The witness spent that night with a Serbian friend who had decided not to evacuate. During the night, JNA forces stationed in Celopek and Serbia proper bombed Zvornik. The next morning, the "Arkanovci" came by each house requesting to see people's identification. She witnessed Serbian soldiers driving through town in large trucks collecting Muslims out of the basements to which they had fled. The Muslims were put on the trucks with their hands above their heads. (Department of State)

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NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Following consultations with the members of the Security Council, the President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the Council, at its 3242nd meeting, on 18 June 1993, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation between Iraq and Kuwait":

"The Security Council is deeply concerned by the Government of Iraq's de facto refusal to accept the United Nations Special Commission's (UNSCOM) installation of monitoring devices at rocket test sites and to transport chemical weapons-related equipment to a designated site for destruction, as set out in a report from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission to the President of the Security Council (S/25960).

"The Council refers to resolution 687 (1991) requiring Iraq to permit the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to undertake immediate on-site inspection of any locations designated by the Commission. The agreement on facilities, privileges and immunities between the Government of Iraq and the United Nations, and resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991), clearly establish Iraq's obligation to accept the presence of monitoring equipment designated by the Special Commission, and that it is for the Special Commission alone to determine which items must be destroyed under paragraph 9 of resolution 687 (1991).

"Iraq must accept installation by UNSCOM of monitoring devices at the rocket test sites in question and transport the chemical weapons-related equipment concerned to a designated site for destruction.

"The Council reminds Iraq that resolution 715 (1991) approved plans for monitoring by the Special Commission and the IAEA which clearly require Iraq to accept the presence of such monitoring equipment at Iraqi sites, designated by the Special Commission, to ensure continuing compliance with its obligations under Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

"Iraq's refusal to comply with decisions of the Special Commission, as set out in the report of the Executive Chairman, constitutes a material and unacceptable breach of the relevant provisions of resolution 687 (1991), which established the cease-fire and provided the conditions essential to the restoration of peace and security in the region, as well as violations of Security Council resolutions 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) and the plans for

future ongoing monitoring and verification approved thereunder. In this context, it recalls the statements of 8 January 1993 (S/25081) and 11 January 1993 (S/25091), and warns the Government of Iraq of the serious consequences of material breaches of resolution 687 (1991) and violations of its obligations under resolution 715 (1991) and the above-mentioned plans.

"The Council reminds the Government of Iraq of its obligations under Security Council resolutions and its undertakings to provide for the safety of inspection personnel and equipment. The Council demands that the Government of Iraq immediately comply with its obligations under Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991), and cease its attempts to restrict the Commission's inspection rights and operational capabilities."